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Charlie Bunker, Independent Researcher
Introduction
Russia’s war against Ukraine has exposed a fundamental weakness in Western escalation management: the assumption that restraint automatically produces stability. Since 2022, Western governments have sought to balance military support for Ukraine with the avoidance of direct confrontation with Russia. Yet Moscow has repeatedly demonstrated an ability to exploit this caution, using nuclear signalling and coercive rhetoric to shape the limits of Western policy.
The full-scale invasion of Ukraine has become a critical stress test for the post-Cold War European security order. With Russia pursuing a maximalist strategy while facing sustained NATO-backed support for Ukraine, the conflict continues to carry a persistent risk of escalation. Escalation occurs when one or more actors increase the intensity or scope of conflict by crossing thresholds perceived as strategically significant. This can take multiple forms, including nuclear signalling, the geographic expansion of hostilities, or increasingly aggressive political rhetoric. Because escalation involving a nuclear-armed state can be intentional, accidental, or miscalculated, escalation management remains a central strategic challenge.
However, the current Western approach is increasingly exposed as inadequate. Grounded in assumptions of shared rationality, deterrence, and credible signalling, Western policy struggles against a Russian state that treats escalation as a legitimate instrument of statecraft and actively manipulates risk to achieve political objectives. Despite inconsistent follow-through on its threats, Russia has successfully exploited Western risk aversion, effectively weaponising fears of escalation to constrain military assistance to Ukraine. By allowing itself to become self-deterred, the West has granted Moscow an effective nuclear veto over parts of its policy response.
In 2026, as Ukraine’s battlefield position gradually improves and the domestic costs of war continue to accumulate for Moscow, the Kremlin faces growing incentives to shorten a conflict it cannot afford to lose. While this increases the risk of intentional escalation, continued Western caution only reinforces Russia’s belief that brinkmanship remains an effective strategic tool. Reclaiming the initiative requires moving beyond reactive escalation management toward a posture capable of shaping Russian expectations. This means demonstrating both the capability and political willingness to impose costs that Russia cannot easily offset.
This article addresses three primary questions:
How does the West conceptualise escalation management?
What shapes Russia’s distinct approach to escalation in the Ukraine conflict?
Which Western weaknesses have enabled Russian brinkmanship?
The article argues that the Western preference for stability-first escalation management has paradoxically granted Russia the strategic initiative by signalling a higher aversion to risk than to the erosion of the international order.
A Western Approach to Escalation Management
The Western approach to escalation is rooted in Cold War deterrence theory and liberal-rationalist assumptions about state behaviour. Deterrence — spanning NATO force posture, economic sanctions, Article 5 commitments, and nuclear signalling — seeks to shape an adversary’s calculations by clarifying the costs of aggression. The objective is either to prevent conflict entirely or to strictly limit its scope through controlled escalation.
This approach assumes that:
actors are broadly rational and cost-sensitive;
adversaries assess escalation risks in relatively similar ways;
escalation can be controlled through credible signalling and deterrent threats;
all parties share a fundamental interest in avoiding instability.
Western escalation management therefore prioritises predictability, threshold management, and gradualism. For deterrence to function, however, signalling must remain credible. Credibility depends not only on military capability, but also on the perceived political willingness to absorb the costs associated with escalation.
This has become a persistent weakness in Western policy toward Russia. When stated red lines are repeatedly tested without meaningful enforcement, deterrence credibility erodes and adversaries are encouraged to continue probing for limits.
In practice, this framework has produced a systemic preference for escalation management rather than escalation dominance.
Pre-2022
Before the full-scale invasion, Western governments primarily relied on economic pressure, diplomacy, and limited military assistance to deter Russia. While training and defensive equipment were provided to Ukraine, more robust military support was considered too escalatory. The costs associated with confronting Russia directly over Crimea or Donbas were widely viewed as disproportionate to core Western interests.
At the same time, NATO enlargement remained a long-term strategic objective, albeit pursued cautiously.
Post-2022
Following the invasion, Western support evolved through a gradual ‘learning by doing’ model. Military aid packages expanded incrementally, with each new capability introduced cautiously in order to avoid triggering direct NATO-Russia confrontation.
While this approach reduced immediate escalation risks, it also signalled self-imposed limits and gave Russia time to adapt.
Risk as an Instrument: Russia’s Escalation Framework
Russia approaches escalation through a fundamentally different strategic framework. Rather than viewing escalation primarily as a danger to be contained, Moscow treats it as an active instrument for shaping adversary behaviour.
This framework can be understood through three interconnected dimensions:
strategic culture;
coercive communication;
adaptive escalation.
1. Strategic Culture
Russian escalation behaviour is shaped by a strategic culture rooted in perceptions of external threat, great-power competition, and regime survival. Moscow views international politics as inherently confrontational, where coercion and force are legitimate tools of statecraft rather than exceptional measures.
As a result, Russia places fewer normative restraints on escalation than Western states. Escalation thresholds are often deliberately ambiguous and more flexible than the rigid, rules-based frameworks favoured by NATO governments.
This produces a model of integrated coercion in which military pressure, political subversion, nuclear signalling, and information operations are combined to test adversary resolve. Escalation therefore serves not only operational goals, but also a communicative function: signalling strength, demonstrating risk tolerance, and reinforcing Russia’s claim to great-power status.
This dynamic is further reinforced by highly centralised decision-making around Vladimir Putin.
2. Coercive Communication
Escalatory rhetoric has become a defining feature of Russian signalling during the war.
The Kremlin routinely employs nuclear threats and references to ‘red lines’ in an attempt to shape Western risk calculations and deter deeper NATO involvement. One example occurred in 2024, when Moscow updated its nuclear doctrine after Ukraine received permission to use British Storm Shadow missiles against targets inside Russia.
However, there remains a consistent gap between Russian rhetoric and Russian behaviour.
Despite repeatedly describing Western weapons deliveries as existential threats, Moscow has often avoided meaningful retaliation when those thresholds were crossed. Russian signalling therefore functions less as a rigid deterrent doctrine and more as a tool for generating uncertainty inside Western decision-making.
This creates a paradox. Russia’s threats are frequently performative, yet they remain strategically effective because Western policymakers cannot fully dismiss the possibility of escalation. The Kremlin exploits this uncertainty to encourage voluntary Western restraint at relatively low cost.
3. Adaptive Escalation
Russia’s conduct reflects a long-term strategy of adaptive escalation designed to gradually expand its room for manoeuvre.
Before 2022, Moscow relied heavily on ‘grey zone’ activities — support for separatists, political subversion, cyber operations, and pressure on neighbouring states — in order to weaken adversaries while avoiding direct confrontation with NATO.
Since the full-scale invasion, this logic has evolved into what can be described as a deterrence-aggression nexus. Russia uses conventional military force to seize territory while simultaneously leveraging its nuclear posture to discourage external intervention.
In practice, this allows Moscow to convert Western fears of escalation into a strategic asset. The objective is not necessarily to win through overwhelming military superiority, but to exhaust Western political will and force a negotiated settlement under a persistent nuclear shadow.
Where Western Assumptions Break Down
The central weakness of the Western approach is that it assumes escalation is universally viewed as undesirable. Russia does not share this assumption.
Where Western governments see escalation as a danger to be minimised, Moscow increasingly treats controlled escalation as a mechanism for shaping adversary behaviour.
1. Failure of Pre-2022 Deterrence
Before 2022, Western governments failed to impose sufficiently credible deterrent costs on Russia.
Following the annexation of Crimea, responses remained largely limited to sanctions and diplomatic pressure. While these measures imposed economic costs, they also signalled that Western resolve did not extend to direct military confrontation over Ukraine.
This caution was reinforced by European dependence on Russian energy and a broader desire to preserve stable relations with Moscow.
In the absence of firm security guarantees for Ukraine, and with the Kremlin expecting a rapid military victory in 2022, the perceived costs of escalation remained manageable from Russia’s perspective.
The problem was compounded by a Western tendency to interpret rationality primarily through material cost-benefit calculations. This underestimated the role of Russian strategic culture, regime security concerns, and Moscow’s willingness to absorb risk.
The result was a significant asymmetry of stakes: for Western states, Ukraine represented an important but limited strategic interest; for Russia, the war was framed in existential terms tied to regime legitimacy and great-power status.
By prioritising the avoidance of escalation over proactive deterrence, the West unintentionally created permissive conditions for Russian aggression.
2. Incrementalism and Strategic Drift
Following the invasion, the gradual expansion of Western military aid reduced immediate escalation risks but simultaneously gave Russia time to adapt.
The ‘learning by doing’ model enabled Moscow to adjust battlefield expectations, restructure its economy, and prepare for a prolonged war.
At the same time, repeated self-imposed restrictions on Ukrainian strike capabilities signalled predictability. Russia learned early that key rear-area infrastructure, logistics hubs, and command centres would remain relatively protected from deep strikes.
Rather than preventing escalation, this approach contributed to a self-deterrence trap in which Western caution provided Russia with additional strategic time and space.
By 2026, this has created a dangerous deadlock: any major departure from the established pattern of gradual escalation now risks disrupting Russian expectations and potentially provoking the sharper response that earlier caution was intended to avoid.
3. The Instrumental Use of Nuclear Signalling
Western deterrence theory assumes that threats must be consistently enforced in order to remain credible.
Russia applies a different logic.
Moscow frequently signals a willingness to escalate while simultaneously avoiding direct confrontation with NATO. This allows the Kremlin to weaponise uncertainty itself.
In practice, the deterrent value of Russian signalling often derives not from enforcement, but from the possibility that escalation could occur.
By failing to exploit the repeated gap between Russian threats and Russian behaviour, the West has allowed Moscow’s coercive signalling to shape the boundaries of Western policy.
The reluctance to define and enforce clear Western thresholds has therefore ceded much of the escalation initiative to the Kremlin.
Policy Recommendations
1. Exploit the Enforcement Gap
Western policymakers should place greater emphasis on observed Russian behaviour than on declaratory nuclear rhetoric.
Russian threats must be assessed against the structural realities and catastrophic risks associated with direct escalation, rather than treated automatically as binding constraints.
2. Accelerate Capability Delivery
The West should move beyond the slow ‘learning by doing’ model of military assistance.
Capability delivery should become faster, more integrated, and structured around coherent operational packages rather than isolated transfers spread over extended periods.
At the same time, communication should remain disciplined and framed around defensive objectives.
3. Establish Conditional Deterrence Linkages
Western governments should establish clearer relationships between Russian escalation and the scale of Ukrainian military support.
Specific Russian actions — such as large-scale strikes on civilian infrastructure or the use of prohibited weapons — should automatically trigger predefined increases in Ukrainian strike capability and operational freedom.
This would shift part of the escalation burden back onto Moscow and reduce Russia’s ability to exploit uncertainty asymmetrically.
4. Maintain Credible Off-Ramps
If regime survival remains central to Kremlin decision-making, the West should preserve credible pathways for de-escalation that do not rely on absolute regime humiliation.
However, these off-ramps must be presented from a position of strength. Russia must understand that continued escalation will systematically worsen its strategic position over time.
Conclusion
Russia’s approach to escalation differs fundamentally from the assumptions underpinning Western deterrence strategy.
Where Western governments seek stability through restraint, Moscow increasingly uses escalation itself as a tool of coercion. This asymmetry has enabled the Kremlin to exploit Western risk aversion, constrain military support for Ukraine, and retain the strategic initiative for much of the conflict.
The central challenge for the West is therefore not simply avoiding escalation, but preventing escalation fears from becoming a mechanism of self-deterrence.
Reclaiming the initiative will require a more credible and strategically coherent approach — one capable of imposing sustained costs on Russia while reducing Moscow’s ability to weaponise uncertainty and brinkmanship.
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