Loading...
Since 2022, Rossotrudnichestvo has been operating in a fundamentally different environment. Part of its traditional infrastructure in Europe has been restricted or closed, the agency itself has been placed under European Union sanctions, and Russian Houses have increasingly become the subject of political and security scrutiny in host countries. In its sanctions justification, the EU describes Rossotrudnichestvo as one of the key state instruments of Russian soft power and hybrid influence, while the agency itself presents its activities as international humanitarian cooperation and public diplomacy.
However, pressure on the traditional model has not resulted in a contraction of activity. On the contrary, throughout 2026 a different model has become increasingly visible.
Moscow is retaining official representative offices where possible, while simultaneously expanding partner-based Russian Houses, strengthening youth and educational programmes, preparing to launch microgrants for local projects, and increasingly working through local organisations, professional networks, universities, journalists and opinion leaders.
At the same time, the leadership of the agency itself is changing.
On 27 April 2026, Vladimir Putin dismissed Yevgeny Primakov, who had headed Rossotrudnichestvo since 2020, and appointed Igor Chaika as the agency’s new head. Chaika had previously served as deputy head of Rossotrudnichestvo. Following his appointment, he spoke about the need to create a more manageable and results-oriented model, improve programme effectiveness, and bring together state, public and expert structures operating in the external humanitarian sphere.
This rhetoric matters because subsequent decisions in 2026 began to translate it into organisational practice.
In August, the restructuring continued at deputy-head level.
On 7 August, Konstantin Kolpakov was appointed deputy head of Rossotrudnichestvo. His professional background is directly linked to diplomacy, humanitarian cooperation and international youth engagement. Before joining the agency, he worked within the Russian Foreign Ministry system, including on international youth cooperation, and chaired the Commission for International Humanitarian and Youth Cooperation within Rossotrudnichestvo’s Public Council.
The continuity in personnel is also important.
Kolpakov succeeded Pavel Shevtsov, who since 2018 had overseen international cooperation in education and science, support for the Russian language, and Russian schools abroad. In 2026, Shevtsov continued to work with universities, educational online platforms and international student recruitment, including through Russian government quotas.
This makes Kolpakov’s appointment more significant than a routine personnel change: one of Rossotrudnichestvo’s central external educational and humanitarian portfolios is being handed to a diplomat whose previous career was already closely connected with youth and humanitarian engagement.
On 24 August, Natalia Kiseleva was appointed another deputy head of Rossotrudnichestvo.
Her profile is fundamentally different.
Since 2023, she had served as Deputy Governor of Tomsk Oblast responsible for education, youth policy and digital development. Her portfolio included general and vocational education, digital transformation, sport and youth policy. Before that, she served as Deputy Minister of Education of Moscow Oblast and Deputy Head of Moscow’s Department of Education and Science. By training, Kiseleva is a mathematics and computer science teacher; she later specialised in education management.
Rossotrudnichestvo has therefore acquired a senior official whose professional experience combines education, youth policy, digital systems and public administration.
This corresponds closely with the direction in which the agency’s own programmes are moving: education is increasingly intertwined with technological tracks, youth networks and digital tools.
Kiseleva’s career also has a separate bureaucratic dimension.
She joined the Tomsk regional government under Governor Vladimir Mazur. His own career was closely linked to Tyumen Oblast: he worked at ZapSibGazprom, served as Deputy Governor of Tyumen Oblast in 2011–2012, later headed the administration of Tobolsk, and in 2020 moved to the Presidential Administration as Deputy Head of the Presidential Directorate for Domestic Policy.
This career trajectory makes it possible to consider Kiseleva within the broader personnel environment often described in Russian political management as the “Tyumen team” — an informal circle of officials and managers whose careers passed through Tyumen, Yamal, Tobolsk and related federal personnel networks.
For Rossotrudnichestvo, the significance lies less in formal affiliation with any particular informal group and more in the type of managerial experience Kiseleva brings with her: regional executive administration, education, youth policy, digital governance and links to the federal personnel system.
The scale of this model is best understood through Rossotrudnichestvo’s own 2026 Public Declaration of Goals and Objectives.
The document envisages engagement not only with the traditional audiences of cultural centres, but also with active youth, experts, non-governmental organisations, volunteers, media outlets and opinion leaders.
Its objectives explicitly include the creation of international professional communities, the expansion of youth cooperation, post-programme engagement with participants after they return to their home countries, media promotion of activities, and the formation of a “loyal pool of foreign journalists”.
This significantly changes the way the agency’s function should be understood.
A cultural event becomes only one instrument among many. More important is the construction of long-term networks through which Moscow can maintain contact with specific professional and social groups after the end of an individual programme.
This is why Rossotrudnichestvo increasingly makes more sense as an infrastructure of relationships rather than simply a network of buildings.
This logic became particularly visible in September.
On 8 September, Igor Chaika signed agreements to open 11 new partner-based Russian Houses. Eight are to be located in Africa, two in Armenia and one in Thailand. Once expanded, the partner network is expected to include 36 sites.
But more important than the number is the model itself.
Rossotrudnichestvo has stated directly that partner-based Russian Houses are created together with public, educational, cultural and business organisations. In other words, Russian presence no longer necessarily requires the establishment of a new official state representative office with a separate building and large permanent staff.
A local partner already has its own legal structure, audience, personnel and contacts.
Moscow adds the brand, programmes, links with Russian state institutions, educational and cultural products, and potentially funding.
The result is a much more flexible network.
Germany provides a clear example. Following the German authorities’ decision to close the Russian House in Berlin, Kolpakov said in September that Rossotrudnichestvo was already looking for new partners inside Germany and was considering a new platform in Berlin, Bavaria or Saxony.
In other words, shutting down an official centre does not necessarily mean ending the activity. Its functions can be transferred to another organisational platform.
The same principle can be seen in Moldova. After the official Russian House in Chisinau closed on 4 July, Rossotrudnichestvo stated that it would retain a representative attached to the Russian embassy, continue selecting students under government education quotas, and seek alternative formats for humanitarian engagement.
This is one of the most important elements of the emerging model: the infrastructure is becoming less dependent on a specific building.
At the same time, the approach to partner centres is also changing.
Rossotrudnichestvo has said that their work will be assessed according to concrete outcomes: the promotion of the Russian language and education, and the implementation of cultural, youth, scientific and humanitarian projects.
The most effective partner organisations may be given the opportunity to develop several sites across different countries.
This marks a shift away from simple measures of presence — “the centre exists and organises events” — towards a more project-oriented system in which partners are expected to demonstrate measurable activity.
The next stage is planned for 2027.
Rossotrudnichestvo has announced the launch of microgrants for educational, cultural, scientific and technological, youth, historical and humanitarian projects. The programme is expected to be coordinated by the agency’s Public Council. At the same time, the involvement of extra-budgetary financing, including support from Russian businesses, is also being discussed.
For understanding the future structure of Rossotrudnichestvo, this may prove to be one of the most important innovations.
The traditional model assumes that a Russian structure organises the event itself.
The grant model allows the process to work differently: a local activist, educational institution or organisation designs the project, while the Russian side provides support.
This potentially allows Moscow to engage a far larger number of audiences without creating a proportionally larger state apparatus.
Youth occupy a particularly important place in this system.
Rossotrudnichestvo has long used the “New Generation” programme to work with young representatives of political, scientific, civic, media and professional communities.
But an important element of the official strategy is no longer merely the visit of a young participant to Russia. It is the post-programme engagement — maintaining professional and personal contacts and integrating participants into international communities after they return home.
This turns a short-term familiarisation visit into the beginning of a potentially much longer cycle of interaction.
The content of youth programmes is also changing.
In July 2026, the international educational programme “Hello, Russia!” included eight project tracks ranging from biotechnology and artificial intelligence to robotics, plasma aerodynamics and hydrogen engineering. Rossotrudnichestvo itself presented participants as potential future researchers, engineers, entrepreneurs and educators.
This is no longer simply cultural familiarisation with Russia.
It represents outreach to young professional groups in technology and science sectors.
Education remains one of the most durable channels of Rossotrudnichestvo’s international engagement.
The agency participates in the selection of foreign students for study at Russian universities under state-funded quotas and supports the development of educational infrastructure abroad. Official strategic documents explicitly task the agency with promoting Russian education, developing related infrastructure, and engaging with foreign educational institutions.
The geography of the new network is particularly revealing.
Of the eleven new partner-based Russian Houses, eight are planned in Africa: Kenya, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Madagascar, Mali, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo.
This coincides with a broader increase in Russian diplomatic, economic, educational and security activity across the continent.
For Rossotrudnichestvo, Africa is particularly well suited to the partner model: rather than building an expensive permanent state infrastructure, the agency can operate through local public, educational and cultural organisations.
The planned new platform in Thailand indicates that a similar approach is gradually being extended into Southeast Asia.
As a result, the geographical map of Rossotrudnichestvo is changing: some traditional opportunities in Europe are shrinking, while new channels are opening in Africa, the CIS and parts of Asia.
Taken together, these developments point to a more fundamental transformation.
Rossotrudnichestvo is not abandoning the classic model of the official Russian House. But that model is no longer the sole unit of Russian humanitarian presence abroad.
A broader ecosystem is forming around it:
official representative offices, partner centres, local NGOs and educational organisations, universities, student quotas, youth programmes, professional networks, journalists, experts, grant initiatives and Russian businesses.
The central asset is no longer the building.
It is the network of contacts.
Such a structure offers Moscow several advantages. It is cheaper than continuously expanding official infrastructure, more adaptable to political restrictions in individual countries, able to use existing local audiences, and potentially capable of continuing activity even after an official representative office is closed.
At the same time, participation in a cultural or educational project is not in itself evidence of political activity. To assess the significance of these programmes, it is necessary to look not at a single concert, course or visit, but at the system as a whole: who sets the objectives, who finances the projects, which audiences are selected, how contacts are maintained, and which wider networks participants are connected to.
The changes of 2026 indicate that Rossotrudnichestvo is entering a new phase of development.
The new leadership is emphasising performance. Its personnel combine diplomatic, educational, youth and digital experience. Partner-based Russian Houses allow the agency to work through local organisations. Microgrants are intended to add a mechanism for directly supporting local initiatives. Youth programmes are increasingly focused on durable professional relationships, while education remains the basic infrastructure underpinning such engagement.
At the same time, the agency’s geographical focus is shifting towards Africa, the CIS and parts of Asia, while in Europe it is demonstrating an ability to seek partner-based alternatives after official centres are closed.
The result is a more decentralised, adaptive and network-based model of humanitarian presence.
And this is the essence of “Rossotrudnichestvo 2.0”.
A Russian House is increasingly becoming less of a building — and more of a node within a much wider network.
English
Українська