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Valerii Buzov, External Analyst on European Security and Information Operations, Ukrainian International Strategy Center (UISC)
The concept of “Ukraine fatigue” has become increasingly common in European political and media discussions since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. In Spain, the term is often used to describe public exhaustion with the length of the war, the constant flow of news, economic concerns, and fears of escalation. However, Ukraine fatigue should not be understood solely as a natural emotional reaction to a prolonged conflict. It is also a phenomenon actively exploited by Russian information operations seeking to reduce political, military, and societal support for Ukraine.
Importantly, Spain is not a pro-Russian country. Public opinion data demonstrates continued support for Ukraine and sympathy toward the Ukrainian people. Nevertheless, Russian narratives continue to find openings within specific political, media, and social environments. Understanding how these narratives function is important not only for Ukraine but also for European security more broadly.
Any analysis of Russian influence in Spain must begin with an important clarification: Spain remains broadly supportive of Ukraine.
According to data from the Real Instituto Elcano in 2025, approximately 75% of Spaniards supported continued military assistance to Ukraine, while 52% supported Spain participating in future security guarantees for Ukraine. Furthermore, Ukraine remains one of the countries viewed most positively by Spanish society, while President Volodymyr Zelenskyy consistently receives some of the highest approval ratings among international political leaders.
Spanish government policy has largely reflected these attitudes. During a visit to Kyiv in February 2025, Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez announced a new €1 billion military assistance package as part of a ten-year bilateral security and defence agreement between Spain and Ukraine. Sánchez reiterated Spain’s commitment to support Ukraine “for as long as necessary” and emphasized the principle that “nothing about Ukraine without Ukraine, and nothing about European security without Europe.”
These facts demonstrate that Russian influence operations are not succeeding because Spain is fundamentally sympathetic to Moscow. Rather, they operate by exploiting existing concerns, fears, and misunderstandings within an otherwise supportive environment.
Support for Ukraine and vulnerability to Russian narratives are not mutually exclusive.
A citizen may sympathise with Ukraine while simultaneously believing that “peace should come immediately.” They may recognise that Russia launched the invasion but still question military assistance or fear escalation. In such cases, Russian information operations do not seek to persuade audiences that Russia is right. Instead, they seek to weaken support for Ukraine by reframing the debate.
Several structural factors create opportunities for these narratives in Spain:
geographical distance from Russia and the Eastern European security environment;
limited public familiarity with Ukrainian history and statehood;
historical anti-NATO sentiment within parts of the political spectrum;
pacifist traditions that sometimes prioritise de-escalation over deterrence;
information ecosystems vulnerable to disinformation and foreign influence.
These factors do not automatically generate pro-Russian attitudes. However, they can create conditions in which Russian narratives are more likely to resonate.
One of the clearest examples emerged during the Madrid mobilisation under the slogan:
“Paz y neutralidad. No es nuestra guerra”
(Peace and neutrality. This is not our war.)
At first glance, the slogan appears moderate and reasonable. It appeals to peace, neutrality, and non-involvement. However, politically, it carries deeper implications. If the war is presented as “not our war,” support for Ukraine can begin to appear unnecessary or even irresponsible.
Investigations by Maldita.es revealed that of the 28 most influential accounts promoting the mobilisation, 82% had previously spread pro-Russian or anti-Ukrainian disinformation, while 91% had done so repeatedly. These accounts collectively generated more than 800,000 views in a single day. Similar findings were reported by Newtral, which identified promotion from accounts and platforms aligned with Kremlin narratives.
This illustrates an important mechanism of modern information operations. Existing emotions—fear of war, uncertainty, and concern about escalation—are redirected toward political conclusions that ultimately benefit Russia. Rather than placing pressure on the aggressor, the focus shifts toward questioning support for the victim.
The debate surrounding military assistance to Ukraine provides another example of how Russian framing can influence public discourse.
In 2022, Podemos leader Ione Belarra referred to supporters of military assistance as “partidos de la guerra” (“parties of war”), arguing that those advocating arms deliveries were contributing to the continuation of the conflict.
Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez responded by stating:
“No ha faltado diplomacia; lo que ha sobrado es agresión.”
(“There has not been a lack of diplomacy; what there has been is too much aggression.”)
This exchange highlights two competing interpretations of the conflict. One focuses primarily on the risks associated with supporting Ukraine militarily. The other focuses on the source of the conflict itself—Russian aggression.
Russian information operations benefit when public discussions shift from the causes of the war to debates about the legitimacy of supporting Ukrainian self-defence. In such cases, attention moves away from occupation, missile strikes, deportations, and other consequences of Russian actions and toward concerns about escalation and military assistance.
A similar pattern appeared in statements issued by the Communist Party of Spain (PCE), which characterised weapons deliveries as a step toward prolonging the conflict while simultaneously invoking concerns about “Russophobia” and misinformation. Such framing does not necessarily support Russia directly, but it contributes to narratives that weaken support for Ukraine.
Russian influence in Spain does not rely solely on political rhetoric.
The Spanish language has long been a strategic priority for Russian international information operations due to its global reach. Although EU sanctions limited the activities of RT and Sputnik within Europe, Russian messaging continues to circulate through alternative channels.
These include:
Telegram networks;
YouTube channels;
social media platforms;
pseudo-analytical websites;
local influencers;
content imported from Latin American information ecosystems.
A notable example is the Spanish-language Pravda network.
Research by Maldita.es in 2025 identified 25 Telegram channels feeding content into the network. Nearly one-third of the content published on Pravda websites appeared shortly after publication on these channels. The network itself drew material from more than 1,200 Telegram sources, including Russian state-linked outlets such as Sputnik and TASS.
The significance of this system lies not in any single article but in its ability to amplify, repeat, and normalise narratives. Messages move from Telegram to websites, then into social media discussions, eventually becoming detached from their original source. As a result, audiences may unknowingly repeat narratives that originated within Russian information ecosystems.
The most enduring challenge may be historical rather than technological.
For decades, Russian state narratives have promoted the idea that Ukrainians and Russians constitute “one people.” Institutions such as RUSI and UkraineWorld have identified this narrative as one of the core ideological foundations of Russian information warfare.
The effectiveness of this narrative depends on broader historical perceptions.
Many Western educational, cultural, and academic frameworks have historically approached Eastern Europe through a Russia-centred lens. The Ukrainian Institute has repeatedly argued for the decolonisation of knowledge about the region, noting that the experiences and perspectives of peoples historically subordinated to the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union remain underrepresented.
Although this issue should not be exaggerated, examples continue to emerge. In 2025, El País reported on a case involving Universidad San Pablo CEU in Madrid, where students participating in a geopolitics programme visited the Russian Embassy and were presented with official Russian interpretations of the war, including references to the so-called “special military operation.”
This incident should not be generalised to the Spanish academic system as a whole. However, it demonstrates how Russian narratives seek access not only to social media audiences but also to educational environments where future policymakers, analysts, and opinion leaders are being formed.
The objective of Russian influence operations is not necessarily to create support for Moscow.
A more achievable goal is to reduce support for Ukraine.
If Ukraine comes to be viewed as:
a distant conflict;
an expensive burden;
a source of instability;
or a problem primarily affecting Eastern Europe,
then public support for military assistance, sanctions, and long-term commitments may gradually weaken.
For Ukraine, this creates direct risks to military and political support.
For Europe, the consequences may be broader. If information operations successfully weaken political resolve through fear, economic concerns, and historical misconceptions, similar methods can be applied elsewhere—whether in relation to Moldova, the Baltic States, or future European security crises.
To counter these narratives, Ukraine and pro-Ukrainian actors in Spain should focus on three priorities.
First communication should increasingly emphasise shared security interests. Supporting Ukraine should be presented not only as a moral obligation but also as a contribution to European security and stability.
Second engagement in Spanish-language information spaces should be systematic and long-term. Universities, media outlets, local institutions, Ukrainian community organisations, and fact-checking platforms all represent important venues for communication.
Third greater efforts should be devoted to explaining Ukraine’s history, statehood, and political identity. Countering Russia-centred interpretations requires consistent use of evidence, scholarship, and accessible public education.
Russian narratives about “Ukraine fatigue” in Spain do not succeed because Spain is fundamentally pro-Russian. They succeed when existing fears, geographical distance, limited historical knowledge, and information vulnerabilities create opportunities for manipulation.
Spain remains broadly supportive of Ukraine. However, support should not be assumed to be permanent or immune to influence operations. Russian information strategies increasingly focus not on generating sympathy for Moscow, but on encouraging caution, fatigue, hesitation, and disengagement.
For this reason, the challenge is not simply to rebut disinformation. It is to maintain a clear understanding that support for Ukraine remains closely connected to the future security and stability of Europe itself.
English
Українська